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In early 2002, the Royal Ahold subsidiary, Stop & Shop Supermarkets, offered to purchase the Big V 
supermarket chain, which was in bankruptcy c ourt after three successive, unsuccessful leveraged 
buyouts over the past ten years.  At a later date, Pathmark Supermarkets joined the offer to purchase.  
Big V was Wakefern Food Corporation’s largest member.  The acquisition was a horizontal merger in at 
least three local markets, Newburgh NJ, Poughkeepsie NY, and Trenton NJ.   
 
This research was conducted for the Wakefern Food Corporation who provided much of the underlying 
data and information.  We presented this report to the Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade 
Commission in March 2002 and to the New Jersey and New York Attorney Generals, Antitrust Section 
in April 2002.  Thereafter, the Federal Trade Commission issued a second request in its merger review, 
and the bankruptcy judge ruled against the Stop & Shop/Pathmark offer.  Big V subsequently was 
purchased by Wakefern and remains in the Shop Rite supermarket cooperative system. 
 
Key words:  horizontal merger, market power, predation   v 
Executive Summary 
 
•  Starwood Ceruzzi purchased three Big V Shop Rite stores in the Poughkeepsie New York market 
(Dutchess County) in February 2001. Starwood Ceruzzi closed one of the three stores and it is 
vacant, across the street from a Stop & Shop.  The remaining two are operated as Stop & Shops. 
This sale removed the three stores from the Wakefern Cooperative system, violating the Wakefern 
Stockholders Agreement and thus triggered payments required under the Stockholders Agreement 
that have not yet been paid.   
•  In February 2002, Royal Ahold/Stop & Shop offered to purchase 27 of the remaining 31 Big V 
Shop Rite stores for $255 million. 
•  Many of the Big V stores are run down due to the lack of remodeling or expansion because the 
triple LBOed Big V was forced to funnel cash flow to debt holders. 
•  At an average price of $9.44 million per store, the Royal Ahold/Stop & Shop offer is paying for 
more than bricks and mortar.  It is buying Big V Shop Rite’s consumer franchise, its store sites, its 
market share, and the attendant increase in market price (ability to raise prices) when Big V Shop 
Rite is converted and combined with the Stop & Shop franchise. 
•  The conversion of Big V Shop Rites to Stop & Shops will actually raise the wholesaling charges 
that these supermarkets pay. C&S Wholesale Supply is higher priced than Wakefern.  This fact was 
documented and relied upon in a recent bankruptcy court decision (Big V Supermarkets et al. v. 
Wakefern Food Corp., 267 B.R. 71 at 19). 
•  An examination of the impact of the 27 store acquisition at the trade area level indicates that for 11 
of these stores, the combination with Stop & Shop or Super G (Royal Ahold in Trenton) results in 
Royal Ahold’s merged entity controlling more than 50 percent of trade area sales, or being the sole 
remaining competitor where the leader has 65 percent of trade area sales (one store). 
•  An unhealthy symmetry also exists in many of these merged trade areas.  In the Trenton, 
Newburgh, or Poughkeepsie market areas and in Westchester County, for nearly all impacted stores 
within one of these areas, the number two firm is identical, and in most the number three firm is 
also identical.  For example, in the Trenton market, each merged Super G Big V duo faces Acme as 
a distant number two and Super Fresh (A&P) as an even more distant number three firm.  This 
symmetric arrangement facilitates and significantly enhances the likelihood of tacit collusion. 
•  There are four other trade area markets where the impact of the merger is questionable and may 
raise consumer prices. 
•  One is able to define relevant geographic markets for supermarket sales (the product market) for 
Poughkeepsie, Newburgh, and Trenton. Using the Metro Market Studies annual trade publications 
one can examine the trend in seller concentration for Poughkeepsie, Newburgh, and Trenton.  From 
1994 to 2000 the HHI increased slightly from 2301 to 2326 in Poughkeepsie and decreased from 
3446 to 2688 in Newburgh.  In spite of the disintegration of Grand Union and Big V and the entry 
of Wal-Mart, concentration remains extremely high, well above the 1800 point “challenge likely” 
cutoff, in these New York Markets. The HHI increased from 1308 to 1614 in Trenton.   
•  Using current (February 2002) store level data, one can compute the HHI and the change in HHI for 
the Poughkeepsie, Newburgh, and Trenton markets if Stop & Shop acquires the 27 stores. 
•  If the sales of the Wappinger Falls Big V Shop Rite, a store that is not being acquired because it 
will be forced to close, are captured by other stores in the area in proportion to their sales volumes, 
then the HHI for the Poughkeepsie market increases 794 points from 2020 to 2814.  Stop & Shop’s 
post acquisition market share is 49.3 percent. 
•  Alternatively, if the antitrust agencies block the current acquisition and undo the January 2000 
acquisition of the Big V Shop Rites by returning them to Big V, then the HHI in the Poughkeepsie 
market drops 382 points from 2020 to 1638.  This moves the HHI to a level below the Merger 
Guideline’s 1800 point “challenge likely” threshold.   vi
•  In the Newburgh New York market, the proposed Royal Ahold acquisition increases the HHI 1501 
points from 3090 to 4591. The combined market share of Stop & Shop and Big V gives the Stop & 
Shop chain a 65.5 percent post acquisition market share. 
•  In the Trenton New Jersey market, the proposed Royal Ahold acquisition increases the HHI 722 
points from 2240 to 2962.  Royal Ahold/Super G market share after the Mayfair acquisition in the 
mid 1990’s and the proposed acquisition of Big V is 45.6 percent. They are the market leader via 
acquisition rather than by de novo entry (new store construction). 
•  Analysis of entry conditions indicates that entry barriers exist in the southern New York and 
Trenton New Jersey supermarket industry.  Royal Ahold conduct in real estate markets, including 
lawsuits to prevent the entry of competitors, creates mobility barriers as well as entry barriers in 
New York and New Jersey markers.  Entry would not be likely, timely or sufficient to defeat a 
nontransitory price increase due to the exercise of market power, post acquisition. 
•  Competitive effects analysis corroborates and sustains the structural analysis at the trade and market 
area level. 
•  Supermarkets in more concentrated markets charge higher prices.  Recent analysis of Stop & Shop 
milk pricing in New England indicates Stop & Shop exercised price leadership and market power 
on this most important product in supermarkets, raising its prices above those of other smaller 
supermarkets after the 1996 Stop & Shop/Edwards merger in the Hartford and Providence IRI 
market areas. 
•  Prior analysis of Stop & Shop/Super G pricing indicate that they zone price and that prices are 
higher in a statistically significant fashion in more concentrated markets.   
•  Using the documented statistical relationship between the HHI and Stop & Shop prices, the increase 
in the HHI increases Stop & Shop retail prices 2.5 percent in Poughkeepsie. 
•  If Stop & Shop returns to Big V the two operating supermarkets that Starwood Ceruzzi bought and 
sold to Stop & Shop, the HHI in Poughkeepsie drops 18.9 percent.  Stop & Shop retail prices would 
decline 1.2 percent. 
•  The 48.6 percent increase in the HHI in the Newburgh, New York market increases Stop & Shop 
retail prices 3.1 percent. 
•  The 32 percent increase in the HHI in the Trenton N.J. market increases Super G prices 2 percent. 
•  Wakefern Food Corporation estimates that the loss of Big V Shop Rite, their largest member, will 
reduce their volume 13 percent.  They estimate that this will increase charges to cover fixed 
overhead $212,000 for each supermarket in the cooperative system. Thus, the Royal A hold 
acquisitions, if unchallenged, will raise a leading rival’s costs thereby allowing Royal Ahold to 
raise prices to cover the cost of these acquisitions and also elevate their profits.   
•  In his opinion in the recent bankruptcy court case, the judge found that the impact comes perilously 
close to triggering financial covenants in Wakefern Food Corporation debt structure, the result of 
which would place Wakefern Food Corporation in Chapter 11.  Thus, these strategic moves by 
Royal Ahold may ultimately be predatory because they may result in the destruction of a competitor 
by raising its costs to a level that forces the competition out of the region’s market. 
•  Trade area analysis indicates that Royal Ahold should be required to divest 11 stores.  These stores 
have annual sales of $332 million, which is 38.1 percent of the 27 store total sales in the offer. 
•  Market level analysis indicates that Royal Ahold should be prohibited form acquiring all Big V 
Shop Rites in Poughkeepsie, Newburgh, and Trenton.  When combined with the impacted trade 
area stores in Westchester County, Royal Ahold should be prohibited from acquiring 17 stores with 
$523 million in sales that account for 59.8 percent of the 27 proposed acquisition stores sales 
estimate. 
•  Prior research on divestitures and post divestiture performance of stores shed by Royal Ahold to 
obtain approval of the Royal Ahold/Edwards acquisition of Stop & Shop indicate that divestiture is 
not a viable enforcement strategy.  On this point, the six store divestiture to Ro-Jacks in Providence 
resulted in the bankruptcy of that chain.  vii 
•  Divestiture in this case would be perverse.  Wakefern would have to obtain approval of the antitrust 
agencies to buy back its member’s stores.  From an antitrust and cooperative economics 
perspective, the burden is on the wrong party.  Competitors should not be allowed to use the 
antitrust process to severely weaken or destroy a cooperative.  In this case, such action severely 
weakens or destroys the procompetitive impacts of the nation’s largest wholesale grocery 
cooperative. The costs of its wholesaling services to Big V are lower than those of the alternative 
supplier to Big V, C&S Wholesale. Due to this fact and other reasons, the independent Shop Rite 
supermarket operators are tough competitors in the Northeast. 
•  For all of the reasons given is this report, I conclude that the current Royal Ahold offer to buy 27 
Big V Shop Rite stores should be blocked and its prior purchase of the three Big V Shop Rites in 
the Poughkeepsie market should be undone.  If further information becomes available, it might alter 
some of the analysis and intermediate conclusions in this report, however, I seriously doubt that any 
forthcoming information would alter my final conclusions.  This is one of the most anticompetitive 
acquisitions that I have seen in the supermarket industry in 25 years. 
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1.  Introduction 
   
  Wakefern Food Corporation (“Wakefern”) is a 
wholesale grocery cooperative that services its 41 
members—Wakefern stockholders—who own and 
operate Shop Rite supermarkets in New Jersey, New 
York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Delaware.  Many 
of Wakefern’s members are small businessmen who own 
only one or two ShopRite supermarkets.  Although 
Wakefern provides a variety of financial, promotional, 
technological and other services to its members, the 
cooperative’s most important function is to p urchase 
food and non-food items in enormous volume for resale 
to its members who, in turn, sell the goods in ShopRite 
supermarkets.  Big V Supermarkets, Inc. (“Big V”) is the 
largest member of Wakefern. 
  Two transactions are examined in this report.  Unless 
blocked by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), 
both of these transactions will further The Stop & Shop 
Supermarkets Company’s (“Stop & Shop”) continuing 
rise to dominance via acquisition in the northeast United 
States.  The largest transaction in question is Stop & 
Shop’s February, 2002 proposal to acquire 27 of the 
remaining 31 Big V stores. The second transaction at 
issue is Stop & Shop’s acquisition or lease of two former 
Big V Stores.  In particular, a real estate developer that 
in the past has developed stores for Stop & Shop, 
Starwood Ceruzzi, purchased three Big V stores, and in 
February 2001 sold or leased two of them to Stop & 
Shop.  The third, located across the street from an 
existing Stop & Shop supermarket, has remained without 
a tenant for over one year.  As discussed later in this 
report ( see Section 7), Starwood Ceruzzi’s failure or 
refusal to lease this site is an example of yet another 
anti-competitive tactic (“land banking”) being employed 
by Stop & Shop and its corporate parent, Royal  Ahold, 
to eliminate competition.  Through its relationship with 
Starwood Ceruzzi, Ahold/Stop & Shop are effectively 
obtaining control of shopping centers and other sites 
suitable for a supermarket in areas where Ahold or Stop 
& Shop operate, but are refusing to lease such sites to 
Stop & Shop competitors.   
  This report analyzes, among other things, the impact 
of these transactions on retail grocery prices in the lower 
Hudson Valley region
1 and Trenton, New Jersey, where 
Big V operates; whether consumers will have to pay 
higher prices or will receive less product variety as a 
result of diminishing competition among supermarket 
chains if the antitrust authorities do not challenge these 
transactions; and the consequences of these two 
                                                             
1 Here the lower Hudson Valley region is defined to include 
all counties where Big V operates including Westchester and 
Sullivan Counties. 
transactions in other markets (i.e., besides the Hudson 
Valley and Trenton markets) where chains owned by 
Royal Ahold (such as Stop & Shop, Giant, and Super G) 
and Wakefern members other than Big V compete. 
  The analyses and opinions offered in this report are 
based upon the following: 
•  Business documents provided by Wakefern, as cited. 
•  Store location maps prepared under my direction by 
Wakefern. 
•  Information from trade publications, including 
various annual issues of Metro Market Studies’ 
(“MMS”) Grocery Distribution Analysis and Guide. 
•  Industrial organization and cooperative economics 
research literature, as cited. 
•  My prior research on and expert economic analysis 
of Stop & Shop and the Ahold’s acquisition of Stop & 
Shop in 1996, Ahold’s attempted acquisition of 
Pathmark Supermarkets in 1999, and the Suiza Foods 
acquisition of the Stop & Shop milk processing plant in 
2001.  I performed the first and last analyses for 
Attorneys General for several New England states in 
connection with their antitrust review of these 
transactions. 
•  My research and expert economic analysis on behalf 
of a shopping mall owner in Milltown, New Jersey who 
was unsuccessfully sued by Royal Ahold for alleged 
violations of a contract to sell a store site to Ahold. 
•  My research and expert economic testimony in 1999 
for Royal Ahold in its suit against Penn Traffic/Quality 
Foods Inc. The Royal Ahold claim was that Penn 
Traffic/Quality Foods Inc. attempted to and did 
monopolize the Jamestown, New York market.  
•  My research on retail milk pricing in New York and 
New England, including Stop & Shop pricing in IRI 
market areas. 
•  My research over 25 years on the market structure, 
conduct, and performance of the United States food 
industry, including the roles of cooperatives and 
supermarket chains. 
•  Discussions with Wakefern executives and others in 
the grocery industry and academia about the current 
matter. 
 
2. Product Market Definition 
   
The relevant product market for evaluating the 
competitive impact of the proposed Stop & Shop 
transactions is total retail sales (within a given 
geographic market) by supermarkets as defined in this 
section.  Specifically, both Stop & Shop and Big V 
operate conventional supermarkets that primarily are 
superstores.  Supermarkets and superstores are defined 
by Progressive Grocer, a leading trade publication, as: An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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Conventional Supermarket: Any full-line, self 
service grocery store generating a sales volume of $2 
million or more annually. 
 
Superstore:  A supermarket with at least 30,000 
square feet, generating $12 million or more annually 
and offering an expanded selection of non-food 
items.  Specialty departments and extensive services 
are offered (Progressive Grocer, 2001, p. 13). 
 
These stores routinely compete against other 
supermarkets for the primary patronage of consumers in 
the retail food market. The Progressive Grocer definition 
of a supermarket as a store with sales of more than $2 
million per year was established in the early 1980’s.  In 
its report, the USDA (Harris et al., 2002), adjusting only 
for inflation, redefined a supermarket as a s tore with 
year 2000 sales of $4.18 million ($80,000 per week). 
The expanded product line found in today’s much larger 
supermarkets could justify further increasing the 
minimum sales requirement and initiating a minimum 
square foot requirement to qualify as a supermarket. 
Chevalier, in a work published in 1995, defines a 
supermarket as a store with more than 9,000 of selling 
floor space square feet and annual sales of at least $2.0 
million.  In this report, I define a supermarket as a 
grocery store that offers a full array of food products 
(fresh meat, dairy, fresh produce, bakery, packaged 
grocery products) plus some non-food items (paper 
products, pet foods, household cleaners), with sales of at 
least $80,000 per week ($4.2 million per year).  Sales by 
all  stores that fit this definition of a supermarket 
contribute to the overall product market (i.e. retail 
supermarket sales) within a given geographic market or 
trade area. 
 
3. Trade Area Analysis 
 
Shifting now to trade area analysis, competition or 
the lack thereof among supermarkets can occur at the 
store level.  An individual store may occupy such that 
powerful geographic position that even if the overall 
market area is competitive, an operator of a store can 
raise prices.  Supermarket chains routinely use  zone 
pricing (i.e., stores in different areas charge different 
prices) based upon, among other things, the competitive 
conditions confronting that store. 
A supermarket’s trade area is defined as that 
geographic space from which it draws most of its 
customers. The traditional trade area radius is three 
miles. In this study, I analyzed both three- and five-mile 
radius circles around each Big V store that Stop & Shop 
proposes to acquire.  For one Big V store (#209) in the 
very densely populated urban area of Y onkers, New 
York, I also examined supermarkets within a two-mile 
radius.  All supermarkets located within a Big V store’s 
trade area (as defined above) are included in my analysis 
of the competitive effects of Stop & Shop’s proposed 
acquisition.
2 
A supermarket operator’s pricing decisions depend 
upon a number of factors within a given trade area, 
including its share of sales in the trade area, the 
concentration of supermarkets in the area, the degree of 
enterprise differentiation (i.e., the extent to which 
different supermarkets in a trade area target consumers 
with different demographic profiles), and the 
“toughness” of competition from other supermarkets in 
the trade area.  Each of these factors is discussed below 
and then applied to the proposed Stop & Shop/Big V 
combination. 
First, a supermarket’s share of sales in a trade area is 
significant because unilateral pricing tends to occur 
where a supermarket occupies a dominant position in the 
market and consumers have relatively few nearby 
alternatives.  In the industrial organization literature and 
the antitrust case law, a common threshold for 
dominance (and the incipient exercise of unilateral 
market power) is a share of area sales above 40 percent 
with other firms having substantially lower shares of 
area sales (Scherer and Ross, p. 221).
3 
Second, the degree of enterprise differentiation is 
another important determinant of unilateral market 
power (Levy and Reitzes; Caves and Porter).  To the 
extent that different supermarkets target different 
segments of the consuming public, they are not strong 
substitutes for one another.
4  This allows each 
supermarket to elevate price because few consumers will 
switch stores in response to such a price increase.  In the 
                                                             
2 In trade area analysis, examining a larger trade area typically 
translates into a company or store having a lower share of area 
sales because more supermarkets are included in the analysis.  
In the current matter, however, this is not true.  An analysis of 
three-mile trade areas identified seven stores where the 
proposed Stop & Shop acquisition increases the combined 
company’s share of sales in the trade area to more than 50 
percent.  In an analysis of five-mile trade areas, the acquisition 
creates anti-competitive effects (as discussed below) in the 
trade areas of these seven stores and six additional stores, for a 
total of thirteen stores, because the Big V and Royal Ahold 
chains in combination saturate the geographic markets 
examined.   
3 Greer (p. 493) uses a 30 percent share cutoff. 
4 Industrial organization studies of the food retailing industry 
have documented the importance of market segmentation and 
mobility barriers to competition in food retailing (Marion 
1987; Cotterill, 1999 and 1993). An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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current matter, enterprise differentiation is an important 
factor in Stop & Shop’s ability to engage in unilateral 
pricing because potential competitors such as Wal-Mart 
Supercenters clearly target the lower half of the 
consumer income distribution (Franklin), whereas other 
supermarkets, including Stop & Shop, Super G and Shop 
Rite, do not target that demographic group. Therefore, 
elimination of Shop Rite in a trade area served by a store 
such as Wal-Mart and one other chain supermarket 
enhances market segmentation and the ability of the 
surviving chain to raise prices. 
Third, eliminating Big V and thereby expanding the 
Stop & Shop franchise reduces the variety of products 
and shopping options available to the consumer.  For 
instance, an inspection of selected Shop Rite and Stop & 
Shop supermarkets revealed t hat Shop Rite offered 
superior selection and a range of prices for ethnic food, 
and that product and price selection of ethnic food varied 
depending on the demographic profile of the consumers 
frequenting the store.  In one Shop Rite, the store had an 
attractive floor-to-case-top designated segment in its 
wall mounted refrigerated case for many different brands 
and package sizes of lox, smoked fish, and all related 
condiments for Jewish and other cured fish aficionados. 
A nearby Stop & Shop of the same size offered only a 
very limited assortment of cured fish in a pile along with 
many other products in an open top refrigerated case.  
The in-store bakery, deli counter, and produce section of 
the Shop Rite also offered more variety and superior 
presentation.  I conclude that Shop Rite is more skilled 
at merchandising food in the metropolitan New York 
area, whereas Stop & Shop offers a distinctly New 
England selection of products.  As a result, eliminating 
Big V will reduce product variety in the area. 
Finally,  the “toughness” or effectiveness of 
competition is relevant to a store’s ability to engage in 
unilateral pricing.  Chevalier has developed an economic 
model of product and capital market interaction which 
predicts that “liquidity constrained” supermarkets are not 
“tough” competitors (Chevalier, p. 1098).  Likewise, 
competitors who are bankrupt (Kmart) or the left-over 
remnants of the carve-up and sale of supermarkets from 
a chain that was bankrupted by financial 
mismanagement (such as the Grand Union stores now 
operated by C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. (“C & S”)) 
are not tough competitors.  The A&P Company, with its 
stores under the A&P, Food Emporium, and Super Fresh 
logos, also has a reputation as a soft competitor. 
More generally, firms that pay in excess o f the 
capitalized value of the competitive rate of return for 
supermarkets (including, as discussed below, Stop & 
Shop by virtue of its proposed purchase of Big V) must 
elevate prices in order to earn a return on their 
investment.  Similarly, at the height of the leveraged 
buy-out (“LBO”) movement, Erivan Haupt, CEO of 
A&P’s parent German company Tengelmann, 
recognized that: 
 
Through leveraged buyouts and takeovers, A&P’s 
competitors are becoming loaded with debt… They 
will pass along the cost of serving this debt by 
raising prices (Furhman).  
 
To increase their own profits, unleveraged 
competitors tend to follow the lead of leveraged 
competitors with large market share in raising prices (see 
Cotterill, 1993 at 177 for empirical evidence in addition 
to Chevalier on this point).  In this case, Stop & Shop is 
paying $255 million, or $9.44 million on average, for 
each of the 27 Big V supermarkets that it seeks to 
purchase.  In comparison, in 1996, it sold five modern 
supermarkets and one not-so-modern supermarket in the 
Providence market to Ro-Jacks for less than $20 million.  
Not only is Stop & Shop paying an inflated price to 
acquire Big V, but Big V is the victim of three LBO’s.
5  
Many of its stores are worn out and sorely in need of 
capital investment because the LBO’s have siphoned 
cash that otherwise would have been invested in the 
stores into debt payment and finance charges. By 
Wakefern’s estimate, the investment required in order to 
restore the Big V stores to competitive parity totals 
$52.3 million.  Stop & Shop will attempt to recoup the 
high purchase price it is paying and the capital 
investments it will be required to make by using its post-
acquisition position as the dominant firm in these trade 
areas to elevate prices. 
In contrast to the soft or over-leveraged competition 
discussed above, most Shop Rite supermarkets, backed 
by the Wakefern cooperative system, are tough 
competitors.  The cooperative structure insures that retail 
members receive goods and services at cost (Cotterill, 
1987 and 1997). Rogers and Petraglia, and Haller, 
document that cooperatives in food manufacturing 
industries are competitive yardsticks that effectively 
reduce prices and margins.  The Wakefern cooperative is 
doing the same in the Northeast wholesale grocery 
market.  The wholesale prices it charges to Big V are 
lower than the prices charged by C&S ( Big V 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 267 B.R. 
                                                             
5 According to Kenneth Jasinkiewicz, Chief Financial Officer, 
Wakefern Food Cooperative, the first LBO was in 1987 by CS 
First Boston.  The second was in 1990 by T.H. Lee and 
Prudential.  The third was in 1993 when $35 million of public 
debt w as used to buy out Prudential (communication with 
author 2/25/2002). 
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71), the leading proprietary wholesaler in the region.  
Lower wholesale prices, of course, translate to lower 
costs for s upermarket retailers and lower prices to 
consumers (whereas soft competition, or competitors 
that overpay in making acquisitions, tend to raise prices). 
Moreover, independent retailers, who often live in 
the community that they serve, work together in the 
cooperative system to reap the benefits of the Shop Rite 
franchise, including its private label, advertising, and 
promotion programs.  A Shop Rite member benefits 
from the entire cooperative’s joint purchasing and 
marketing programs, while retaining the traditional 
independent’s advantage of being well attuned to the 
local market.  Again, this makes Shop Rite operators 
tough competitors.  If the Shop & Stop acquisition is 
consummated, however, the Shop Rite system will 
become a liquidity-constrained, higher-cost operation (as 
discussed below), and thus a softer competitor, which 
translates into higher prices for the consumer. 
Based upon this review of factors that affect 
supermarket pricing in a trade area, I define an 
“impacted” trade area (i.e., an area where the proposed 
Stop & Shop/Big V transaction will have anti-
competitive effects) as one where the proposed 
transaction:  (i) gives Stop & Shop more than 40% of 
sales in the area, or (ii) reduces the number of 
competitors in the trade area to two supermarkets 
(including Stop & Shop), with the other chain having in 
excess of 60 percent of sales in the area.  Dominant firm 
pricing or strong price leader-followship (leading to 
higher consumer prices) is likely to exist in such 
impacted trade areas.  Enterprise differentiation and soft 
competition also routinely occur in such impacted trade 
areas, likewise leading to higher retail prices. 
Tables 1 and 2 identify 17 Big V stores where 
pricing power in a trade area may be substantially 
enhanced by the proposed Stop & Shop transaction.  
Table 1 identifies twelve Big V supermarkets where the 
post-acquisition share of sales captured by Stop & Shop 
is above 40 percent.  In fact, it is above 50 percent in 
these twelve areas.  As for the thirteenth store, Big V 
store #211 in Bedford N.Y., A&P/Food Emporium, a 
soft competitor, has 65.5 percent of the trade area 
volume and the proposed acquisition combines the 
number two and number three chains, producing a 
duopoly in the Bedford Hills N.Y. area.  The trade areas 
for each  of these thirteen Big V stores is discussed 
below. 
The Trenton market exhibits very strong symmetry 
in competition.  With respect to each of the three 
“impacted” Trenton-area Big V stores, Acme is the 
number two rival and Super Fresh (A&P) is the number 
three rival.  In these three Trenton trade areas, these 
three chains have 93.38 percent (store #534), 89.1 
percent (store #536), and 90.4 percent (store #540) of 
supermarket sales in the area, respectively.  In addition 
to only three effective competitors in these trade areas, 
this symmetry in market players enhances the likelihood 
of tacit collusion to elevate prices to consumers. 
A similar situation exists in the Newburgh, New 
York market.  Four of the five impacted Big V stores in 
Newburgh have Price Chopper as their primary 
competitor.  Of these four, two have Hannaford and the 
other two have Weiss as the third most important 
competitor in the market.  The combined post-
acquisition market share of the top three competitors in 
the trade areas of those four Big V stores is 88.4 percent 
(store #265), 88.4 percent (store #210), 91.6 percent 
(store #243), and 96.5 percent (store #248).  In addition 
to Stop & Shop’s unilateral pricing power, the other 
stores in these trade areas may follow each other to 
elevate prices to consumers that live and shop in these 
areas.
6 
The fifth impacted Big V store in Newburgh is 
Big V Shop Rite store #232 in Monroe, New York.  As a 
result of the proposed acquisition, Royal Ahold/Stop & 
Shop would capture 67.9 percent of supermarket sales in 
the trade area.  Moreover, it will have only one 
competitor, a Wal-Mart.  Given that Stop & Shop and 
Wal-Mart target different segments of the consumer 
population based on income levels (i.e., Stop & Shop 
targets upper income and Wal-Mart targets lower income 
consumers), price elevation is virtually assured. 
There are two impacted trade areas in the 
Poughkeepsie market (Dutchess County).  Stop & Shop 
has declined to purchase the Wappinger Falls Big V 
store because the store is losing share to Stop & Shop’s 
new store in the area and will close without further 
action by Stop & Shop.  This is direct evidence that 
Big V’s highly leveraged condition has prevented it from 
investing capital to remain an effective competitor. 
Big V store #256 in Fishkill i s a different story.  
Here, the post-acquisition Stop & Shop share of 
supermarket sales increases to 59.1 percent and the 
second firm is Wal-Mart with only 25.7 percent.  A very 
distant number three is A&P with 9.35 percent.  The 
result is that, in this trade area, the only competitors to 
Stop & Shop will either target a different segment of the 
consumer population or constitute soft competition. 
In the Westchester County market, there are three 
impacted Big V stores.  The Croton on Hudson store 
(#206), when combined with Stop & Shop, will give 
                                                             
6 In its proposed acquisition, Stop & Shop has declined to 
purchase the North Plank Road Newburgh store (#243) 
because, according to the information I have obtained from 
Wakefern, it is not expandable. An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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Stop & Shop a 58.3 percent share of supermarket sales 
with only one competitor, A&P/Food Emporium (which, 
as noted above, is soft competition).  In the Thornwood 
urban neighborhood, the proposed transaction gives Stop 
& Shop a 51.2 percent share of supermarket sales and 
only one competitor (albeit a soft one) of significant 
size, A&P/Food Emporium, with 34.1 percent share of 
supermarket sales. 
The last impacted trade area in Westchester County 
surrounds the Big V Shop Rite (#211) in Bedford Hills.  
The proposed transaction reduces the number of 
supermarket operators from three to two, with 
A&P/Food Emporium capturing 65.5 percent and Stop 
& Shop 34.5 percent of area sales.  Again, economic 
research and prior analysis of trade practices predict that 
the result will be higher prices for consumers who live 
and shop in this trade area. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, I conclude that Stop 
& Shop unequivocally should be banned from 
purchasing all thirteen of these stores. 
Table 2 identifies four other Big V stores in trade 
areas that may suffer anti-competitive effects if these 
stores are sold to Stop & Shop.  They are not included in 
Table 1, the DO NOT SELL TO ROYAL AHOLD 
category, because these trade areas are not “impacted” 
(as defined above) by the proposed transaction since 
Stop & Shop’s share of supermarket sales following an 
acquisition of Big V is below 40 percent.  Nonetheless, 
these stores are located in densely populated urban areas, 
where the trade area was restricted to three miles (#271, 
#283) or two miles (#209).  As drawn, these trade areas 
have a large number of competing supermarkets 
(between nine and eleven).  More careful investigation 
of the demographics and shopping patterns in these areas 
might reveal that smaller trade areas exist for these 
Big V stores, which would enhance the anti-competitive 
impact of the proposed Stop & Shop acquisition.  The 
fourth store, located in Pennington, New Jersey, is truly 
questionable. It faces competition from two independent 
supermarkets as well as two other operators including 
Acme.  
 
4.  Market Level Analysis 
 
  Although it is not possible given current available 
information to define the relevant geographic market for 
all Big V stores acquired or to be acquired by Stop & 
Shop, there are three identifiable markets that encompass 
many of these Big V stores.  Those markets are 
Poughkeepsie and Newburgh, New York and Trenton, 
New Jersey. 
The Poughkeepsie market is coextensive with 
Dutchess County.  On the west it is delimited by the 
Hudson River.  On the east is the Taconic mountain 
range and, beyond that, predominantly rural 
northwestern Connecticut.  For these reasons, travel in 
the County is primarily north-south rather than east-
west.  To the south is relatively rural Putnam County and 
then, further south, the upscale exurb of North 
Westchester County.  North of Dutchess County is rural 
Columbia County, which has no large or middle-sized 
cities.  MMS, in its Grocery Distribution Analysis and 
Guide, uses county wide information to compute market 
share.  
The Newburgh, New York market is coextensive 
with Orange County, New York.  To the east is the 
Hudson River.  North is rural Ulster County.  The 
southern portion of Orange County contains Harriman 
and Bear Mountain state parks, an extensive forested and 
mountainous barrier to more densely populated 
Rockland County.  To the northwest are the Catskill 
Mountains in Sullivan County, with no significant retail 
venue until Monticello, New York, which is 
approximately twenty miles northwest of Middletown, 
New York—the last retail venue in Orange County as 
one travels Route 17.  To the west is rural Pike County 
in northeastern Pennsylvania. This definition of the 
Newburgh market differs from the MMS definition, 
which includes Pike County in its Newburgh market. 
The Trenton, New Jersey market area is only the 
western portion of Mercer County plus the Bordentown 
city area that is contiguous with Trenton and 
immediately south of western Mercer County.  Eastern 
Mercer County is the very upscale area of Princeton, 
Princeton Junction and Hightsville.  Consumers from the 
Princeton environs do not shop in Trenton and  vice 
versa.  This definition differs from the MMS definition, 
which relies upon county units, in this case Mercer 
County. 
 
4a.  Trends in Concentration in the Poughkeepsie, 
Newburgh, and Trenton Markets: 1994 to 2000. 
When examining the impact of acquisitions on 
market structure, conduct and performance, it is 
instructive to examine changes in market concentration 
over time.  Has concentration, as measured by the 
Hirshman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), increased, and to 
what level, over time? 
The only source for information on HHI levels and 
trends over the recent past is contained in MMS’ annual 
trade publications.  Table 3 identifies all supermarket 
competitors, their market shares (based on supermarket 
sales in the relevant market), and the HHI for the 
Poughkeepsie, Newburgh, and Trenton markets as 
defined by MMS for 1994, 1997, and 2000.  The 
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines indicate that a An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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challenge to a proposed merger is “likely” when HHI 
exceeds 1800 points. 
For Poughkeepsie, the HHI throughout the 1994-
2000 period has been approximately 2300.  Stop & 
Shop’s market share, however, has more than tripled 
from 12.9 to 39.4 percent over this period, in part due to 
its acquisition or lease of 2 Big V Shop Rites from 
Starwood Ceruzzi and the closing of the Poughkeepsie 
Big V store acquired by Starwood Ceruzzi.  In this same 
period, Big V’s share of supermarket sales in the 
Poughkeepsie market has been halved, from 33.4 percent 
in 1994 to 16.1 percent in 2000.  Likewise, Grand 
Union’s market share has decreased from 28.6 percent in 
1994 to 11.5 percent in 2000.  Despite Big V and Grand 
Union’s decreased market share and the entry of Wal-
Mart into the market, market concentration remains 
unchanged and very high at over 2300 points, well above 
the 1800 point “challenge likely” level established in the 
Merger Guidelines. 
In the Newburgh market, HHI has increased from a 
very high 3446 in 1994 to 3861 in 1997 and then 
decreased to a still-very high level of 2688 in 2000.  
Thus, in 2000, market concentration remained well 
above the 1800 “challenge likely” level even after the 
entry of Wal-Mart and Hannaford into the market.  
Grand Union’s market share has disintegrated from eight 
stores with 25.8 percent of the market to four stores and 
6.0 percent of the market in 2000.  In 1997, Grand Union 
operated 9 stores. It appears that Stop & Shop acquired 
four of these stores (and with them 18.2 percent of 
supermarket sales in this market), and Hannaford 
acquired another with a 4.9 percent share in 2000.
7 
In the Trenton market, as defined by Metro 
Market Studies, HHI increased from 1308 in 1994 
to 1614 in 2000.  Royal Ahold entered the market 
with the purchase of two Mayfair/Foodtown stores 
between 1994 and 1997.  In 2000, these stores are 
named Giant (Super G).  As discussed below, if 
Stop & Shop is allowed to acquire Big V, HHI will 
increase well above the 1800 level in the Trenton 
Market. 
 
4b. Current Concentration Levels in the 
Poughkeepsie, Newburgh, and Trenton Markets and 
the Impact of the Royal Ahold Acquisition. 
Poughkeepsie 
Shifting now to current (February 2002) market 
                                                             
7 C&S purchased 185 Grand Union stores in late 2000 and 
subsequently sold 36 of these stores to Stop & Shop and 5 to 
Hannaford (Ogiste; AP Newswire).  Metro Market Studies 
seems to have incorporated these transactions in its 2001 
publication, which measures market share in the year 2000. 
concentration conditions in the three relevant geographic 
markets identified above, information provided by 
Wakefern permits an evaluation of the impact of the 
proposed Stop & Shop transaction on market share and 
concentration in these markets.  Table 4 provides store 
level detail on the competitors in the Poughkeepsie 
market.  Currently, in terms of market share, Stop & 
Shop is number one with a 38.8 percent share of 
supermarket sales in the market (“share of market” or 
“SOM”).  Big V is a very distant second with 13.5 
percent SOM, followed by Price Chopper with 10.2 
percent SOM, A&P with 9.2 percent SOM, C&S-owned 
Grand Union with 7.3 percent SOM, Wal-Mart with 7.0 
percent SOM, and Hannaford with 5.1 percent SOM.  
Five independent operators, mostly small supermarkets 
in outlying niche areas of the market, account for the 
remaining 9.0 percent SOM. 
The HHI for Poughkeepsie is currently 2020.
8 If the 
proposed acquisition is consummated, and assuming that 
Stop & Shop captures all of the closed Wappinger Falls 
Shop Rite business, Stop & Shop’s SOM increases from 
38.8 to 52.3 percent, and HHI increases 1048 points 
from 2020 to 3068.  Even if sales formerly captured by 
the Wappinger Falls store are split between Stop & 
Shop, Hannaford, and the nearby Price Chopper in 
proportion to their current sales, Stop & Shop’s SOM 
increases 10.5 points to 49.3 percent, Hannaford’s 
increases 1.5 points to 6.6 percent, and Price Chopper’s 
increases 1.4 to 11.6 percent with th HHI increasing 794 
points from 2020 to 2814.   
Finally, if the antitrust authorities were to block 
the proposed acquisition and order Stop & Shop to 
divest the two Big V stores acquired from Starwood 
Ceruzzi, and assuming that the closed Wappinger 
Falls Shop Rite sales are captured proportionally by 
Stop & Shop, Hannaford, and Price Chopper, Stop 
& Shop’s market share decreases 9.7 points to 29.1 
percent.  At the same time, Big V’s SOM increases 
6.7 points to 20.2 percent, Hannaford’s SOM 
increases 1.5 points to 6.6 percent, Price Chopper’s 
increases 1.4 to 6.6 percent.  Meanwhile, HHI 
decreases 382 points from 2020 to 1638—a level 
below the 1800 point “challenge likely” threshold 
established in the merger guidelines. 
Newburgh 
  Table 5 presents the current structural configuration 
(i.e., the SOM of firms in the market) of the Newburgh, 
New York (Orange County) geographic market.  Big V 
                                                             
8 This is substantially below the MMS based computation for 
2000 in Table 3 for two reasons.  First is the disintegration of 
Grand Union.  Second is the inclusion of several small single 
store operators that MMS apparently missed. An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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has the greatest market share with a 50.7 percent SOM.  
Stop & Shop is number two with 14.8 percent SOM.  
The proposed transaction, therefore, represents a merger 
between the top two firms in the market, resulting in a 
powerfully positioned dominant firm with 65.5 percent 
of the market.  Among the remaining firms in this 
market are Price Chopper, Wal-Mart, Hannaford, and 
C&S-owned Grand Union with 14.0 percent, 8.0 
percent, 4.4 percent, and 2.1 percent SOM, respectively. 
  If Stop & Shop is allowed to acquire B ig V, the 
Newburgh market HHI increases a huge 1501 points 
from 3090 to 4591.  Indeed, the proposed acquisition in 
Newburgh may raise concerns under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act as well as the Clayton Act. 
Trenton 
  Table 6 presents the current structural situation in 
the Trenton market area (western Mercer County plus 
Bordentown to the south).  Big V has the greatest market 
share with 35.4 percent SOM.  Royal Ahold’s Super G 
Food and Drug subsidiary has two stores and ranks third 
with 10.2 percent SOM.  It  acquired these two stores 
when it acquired the Mayfair chain in the mid-1990’s.  
An important and possibly prescient result of that 
transaction was that Royal Ahold captured the largest 
member of the Twin County cooperative grocery 
wholesaler, which ultimately went bankrupt and no 
longer exists. 
  Acme has the second largest market share in the 
Trenton market with 26.2 percent SOM, and the Super 
Fresh subsidiary of A&P has a 6.5 percent SOM.  The 
rest of the market consists of independent operators, 
including Pennington Quality Market with a 9.7 percent 
SOM, Marrazzo’s Thriftway with a 7.5 percent SOM, 
and three small supermarkets that capture the remaining 
4.5 percent of the market. 
  If the proposed transaction occurs, Royal 
Ahold/Super G becomes the leading firm in Trenton 
solely due to two successive mergers that give it a 45.6 
percent SOM.  It has never built a supermarket in 
Trenton.  The HHI increases from an already high level 
2240 points to 2962 points, a 722 point increase well 
above the 1800 “challenge likely” level established by 
the Department of Justice. 
  Based upon the HHI in the three defined geographic 
markets and the trade area effects analysis described 
above, Stop & Shop should be prohibited from acquiring 
the following stores:  all stores in Newburgh (9 stores 
including the North Plank street store Stop & Shop has 
disavowed), five stores in Trenton, two stores in the 
Poughkeepsie market (including the Wappinger Falls 
store that Stop & Shop has, disavowed) and three stores 
in Westchester County.  Stop & Shop also should be 
required to divest the two stores acquired or leased from 
Starwood Ceruzzi. 
 
5.  Competitive Effects: An Update On The 
Research Literature Concerning The Relationship 
Between Supermarket Concentration And Price 
Level In Local Retail Food Markets 
   
  This Section discusses recent literature addressing 
the topic of “competitive effects,” or the relationship 
between market concentration and price level.  Recently 
Paul Paulter of the Federal Trade Commission published 
a comprehensive review of the research that underpins 
merger enforcement in the United States (Paulter).  In 
that report, he updates the research on 
concentration/price studies in the supermarket industry 
by adding studies by Marion (1998) and Cotterill 
(1999a). 
  Paulter states that:  “[Marion] finds a positive 
correlation between changes in price and changes in 
concentration using 1997 to 1992 data for 25 cities after 
adjusting for cost changes and service quality (Paulter, p. 
46).” 
  In my study, I likewise found that a  positive 
concentration-price relationship exists even after 
controlling for economies of size at the store level and 
the Demsetz quality critique (Demsetz has hypothesized 
that larger share firms in concentrated markets have 
higher prices because they sell higher quality products).  
As Paulter notes, Kimmel also has suggested that firms 
in more concentrated markets have higher costs and thus 
charge higher retail prices.  My study tests both of these 
hypotheses, rejects them, and supports the position that 
the positive correlation between prices charged and 
market concentration is due to the exercise of market 
power.  My study also finds that pricing power tends to 
be more coordinated among firms in the market (as 
opposed to imposed unilaterally) because a firm’s price 
level is more strongly related to HHI than its own market 
share. 
  Paulter’s review of the supermarket research must be 
updated with a few other critical research efforts and 
some historical perspective.  Paulter states that Anderson 
and Newmark provide evidence against the prevailing 
research, which indicates a positive concentration/price 
relationship (Paulter, p. 46).  Cotterill (1993b), an edited 
compendium, contains the Anderson review of studies 
prior to 1993.
9  That review was explicitly requested by 
Peter Rodino, chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, in 1988 after my testimony at a House 
hearing.  My testimony criticized the FTC for not 
challenging the American Stores/Lucky merger and the 
                                                             
9 The author is providing a copy to the Federal Trade 
Commission. An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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Safeway/Vons merger.
10  The 1993 compendium also 
contains “A Response to the Anderson Critique” by this 
author (Cotterill, 1993c).  That chapter in the 
compendium, Marion (1987), and Cotterill (1999a), 
effectively rebut Anderson.   
  Concerning the Newmark study, in an article 
forthcoming in  Agribusiness, Yu and Connor, among 
other things, find serious measurement errors in 
Newmark’s computation of the dependent and 
explanatory variables (including local market 
concentration ratios).  Once these errors are corrected, 
Newmark’s negative results concerning a 
concentration/price relationship are destroyed, and in 
fact, there is a positive and significant relation between 
concentration and price.  
  A more recent study of the concentration-price 
relationship that uses an entirely different approach also 
documents a positive relationship.  Using Information 
Resources Inc. (IRI) scanner data for 1991 and 1992, 
Cotterill et al. (2000) specify a structural model that 
estimates a linear approximate almost ideal demand 
system (AIDS) for national brand and private label 
grocery product prices.  Following Kelton and Weiss, 
they specify a logarithmic first difference equation 
model that allows a comparison of the percent change in 
prices across different product categories.  This avoids 
comparing the price or change in p rice of “apples” to 
“oranges.”  The model’s supply side equations are 
derived within a generalized Bertrand oligopoly model.  
They capture oligopolistic price reactions among 
branded and private label competitors.  The reaction 
equations contain the supermarket four-firm 
concentration ratio to test for elevation of branded and/or 
private label prices in more concentrated markets.  The 
authors state: 
 
prior empirical work on the concentration price 
relationship in grocery retailing suggests that the 
general level of the markup in a local area is related 
to local retailer concentration (Marion 1979; 
Cotterill 1986).  We consequently postulate that the 
retailer markups (m
1 and m
2) should be influenced 
                                                             
10 Subsequently, as Paulter notes, the state of California, 
relying on the concentration-price and profit, share-price and 
profit research base and the expert testimony of professor 
Bruce Marion, among others, successfully challenged the 
American Stores/Lucky merger (California v. American Stores 
Co., 697 F.Supp 1125 rev'd 872 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1989).  
American stores appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on 
grounds that  no state had the right to enforce the federal 
antitrust laws.  The Supreme Court decided 9-0 in favor of the 
state of California and state antitrust enforcement as practiced 
today was born (United States Supreme Court, California v. 
American Stores Co. 492 U.S. 1301 (1989)). 
by the local retailer’s ability to raise price over 
(wholesale) cost and, accordingly, specify m
1 and 
m
2 to be a function of local retail concentration 
(Cotterill et al. 2000, p.118). 
 
M
1 is the markup for branded products and m
2 is for 
private label.  
  Shifting to empirical results, in this cross section 
data set  of branded and private label products for 125 
product categories (e.g. milk) in each of 59 local 
markets, four-firm supermarket concentration (CR4) is 
positively related to both private label and national brand 
prices and significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level 
respectively.  Although the study describes the variable 
as grocery CR4, it actually should be labeled 
supermarket four-firm concentration because it is in fact 
that. It is from the Progressive Grocer, Market Scope, 
IRI market area statistics for supermarket chains.  The 
authors explain their empirical results: 
 
There are two specific results from the cross-
category analysis that should be addressed before 
we proceed to the intracategory analysis.  First, in 
the price reaction equations, we find that the four-
firm retail concentration has a significant and 
positive impact on both branded and private label 
prices.  The coefficient is 50% higher for private 
label products (.057 vs. .028 for national brands), 
suggesting that the price differential between private 
labels and national brands narrows in more locally 
concentrated grocery markets.  This is consistent 
with prior work on the relationship between 
concentration and price in grocery retailing (Marion 
1979, Cotterill 1986), but it represents a significant 
advance due to the much larger number of 
categories and markets studied here. (Cotterill et al. 
2000, p. 121) 
 
  Wall Street analysts have also clearly acknowledged 
the impact of concentration and share on prices and 
profits.  Mark Husson, a leading Wall Street analyst of 
the industry, very bluntly states how supermarkets must 
continue to expand their gross and net margins by 
expanding their market power.  He describes the exercise 
of power as the "gross-margin miracle”: 
 
…what has to happen (for stock prices to increase) 
is it has to become obvious to the (stock) market that 
supermarket retailers are developing pricing power 
inside their marketplaces and that there is a 
structural kind of seismic shift going on in this 
country in the whole of  fast-moving consumer-
goods distribution in favor of food retailers, because An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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that's the only way you're going to keep gross 
margin continuing to move forward.   
  If you can find that pricing power and define it 
somehow as maybe the manufacturer or the 
consumer losing power; with better organized, more 
rational competition and more rational pricing, … 
and if the retailers are developing this pricing power 
from both sides,  along with private brands—and 
taking control of categories is part of that—then I 
think  there is still some real internal momentum 
inside the group, which despite the lack of inflation 
can keep this gross-margin miracle still moving 
forward."  (Supermarket News, 1999). 
 
6. Competitive Effects:  Prior Research on the Royal 
Ahold Chains’ Conduct in the Northeast 
 
  Research completed by me as part of an extensive 
analysis of the proposed Royal Ahold acquisition of 
Pathmark Supermarkets in 1999 provides evidence on 
the exercise of market power by Stop & Shop to raise 
prices, the presence of soft competition, the lack of any 
compelling efficiency in a Stop & Shop/Pathmark 
combination, the existence of barriers to entry in the 
relevant markets, and the ineffectiveness of divestiture in 
reducing the merged entity’s power to raise prices.  
(Cotterill 1999b, and Cotterill et al. 1999).  Nearly all of 
the analysis and evidence presented in those studies 
pertains to the proposed Stop & Shop acquisition of 
Big V and is incorporated into this report.  Here I will 
only highlight the reasoning and key points o f those 
reports as they apply here. 
  First, my analysis revealed that Royal Ahold chains 
zone prices, effectively setting higher prices in more 
concentrated markets.  A statistical study of actual Stop 
& Shop and Super G pricing in eighteen stores in 
different areas yielded a significant and positive 
relationship between Stop & Shop’s prices and the 
market HHI (see Cotterill 1999b, p. 10-13 and p. 34).  A 
linear regression analysis performed to distinguish Stop 
& Shop from Super G revealed that Stop & Shop price 
levels are significantly higher compared to Super G. 
  Second, and as discussed above, soft competition 
exists in the northeast markets where Stop & Shop 
operates, including the market areas at issue now (which, 
again, tends to lead to higher consumer prices) ( see 
Cotterill 1999b, p.10). 
  Third, merger specific efficiency effects, which 
typically translate to lower prices for consumers, have 
not been documented in connection with past Royal 
Ahold acquisitions (see Cotterill 1999b p. 14-16). 
  Fourth, divestitures have not offset the anti-
competitive effects of past Ahold acquisitions.  See 
Cotterill (1999b p. 18-21).  In fact, since my 1999 report, 
Ro-Jacks (which acquired certain stores divested by 
Royal Ahold in connection with a past acquisition) has 
declared bankruptcy, effectively fulfilling the prediction 
of an extensive non-public report that I wrote concerning 
the Ro-Jack divestiture for the Rhode Island Attorney 
General in the fall of 1999. 
  I also analyzed the post-merger performance of 
supermarkets that Royal Ahold divested in 1996 to 
obtain FTC, Connecticut, Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts’ approval of the Royal Ahold/Edwards 
acquisition of Stop & Shop.  See Cotterill et al. (1999).  I 
served as expert economist for these states and met with 
FTC lawyers and economists to construct a consent 
decree.  My analysis of post-merger price conduct found 
that divested firms charged lower prices than 
competitors in the market and attempted to compete on 
price  for a few months; however, thereafter they 
followed Stop & Shop price leadership at higher price 
levels. 
  Further evidence of the ineffectiveness of 
divestitures in promoting post-merger competition is 
found in my recent analysis of milk prices in the Boston, 
Providence, and Hartford IRI markets following Ahold’s 
acquisition of the Edwards supermarket chain.  (Cotterill 
and Franklin, 2001a).
11  Figures 1 and 2 are from that 
study and Figure 3 compares Stop & Shop milk prices in 
Boston to the prices of all other chains.  These charts 
document changes in milk pricing in the Hartford and 
Providence IRI markets after the Edwards/Stop & Shop 
combination.  The Boston IRI market area serves as a 
control area because there were no Edwards stores in 
that area so the merger had no effect on prices charged 
there. 
  In the Hartford market, Stop & Shop milk prices 
were lower than the prices charged by all other chains 
until January 1997, which is roughly six months after the 
Edwards merger was consummated.
12  The same 
phenomenon that existed with respect to milk prices i n 
Hartford also exists for the Providence market, except 
Stop & Shop raised prices three months later, in March 
1997.  This three-month difference may be due to the 
fact that the Rhode Island Attorney General continued 
negotiations on the Ro-Jacks divestiture well into the 
Fall before approving it, requiring Stop & Shop to delay 
                                                             
11 See Cotterill and Franklin, 2001a or any recent edition of 
Progressive Grocer  Market Scope for a definition of these 
market areas. 
12 The vertical line in the figure identifies when the Northeast 
Dairy Compact became effective and elevated raw milk prices.  
Independent of the Compact, Stop & Shop’s prices 
persistently remain well above other chain prices post merger. An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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price increases in Providence.
13   
  I conclude that Stop & Shop’s milk pricing has 
become less competitive in Hartford and Providence 
relative to Boston.  The Royal Ahold/Edwards merger 
and a continued rise in Stop & Shop’s market share in 
these areas has allowed the chain to exercise more 
market power than prior to the merger. 
 
7. Barriers to Entry in Local Geographic Markets 
and Royal Ahold’s Conduct that Enhances Barriers 
to Entry 
 
  This section discusses barriers to competitors 
entering a market in which an Ahold chain operates 
a supermarket.  As discussed below, research 
documents the existence of barriers to entry in food 
retailing.  Moreover, in concentrated markets, entry 
is not timely, likely, or sufficient to defeat a 
nontransitory price increase.  In addition, evidence 
demonstrates that the Royal Ahold chain continues 
its strategy of attempting to become the dominant 
chain in any market where it operates through the 
elimination or reduction of competition.  Indeed, it 
appears that Ahold/Stop & Shop will employ 
virtually any means available to stifle competition, 
including by attempting to create and sustain entry 
barriers in local food markets in New York and 
New Jersey.  A recent and egregious example of 
this strategy is Ahold’s anti-competitive land-
banking strategy, where Ahold or Starwood Ceruzzi 
acquire shopping centers near existing Ahold 
markets and with sites suitable for supermarkets, 
but refuse to lease the site to a competitor of an 
Ahold chain. 
 
7a. Economic Research Documents the existence of 
Entry Barriers in Concentrated Local Markets 
  First, and perhaps most incontrovertible, research 
documents positive concentration-price and 
concentration-profit relationships i n the supermarket 
industry and on the part of the Royal Ahold chain in 
particular.  If there were no barriers to entry, these 
relationships would not exist. 
                                                             
13 Also, note that in the more concentrated Hartford and 
Providence market areas, other supermarket chains did not 
deviate from Stop & Shop’s price leadership and price 
elevation after Compact implementation in 1997 and 1998.  
Not so in Boston.  There, competitors did cheat and drop 
prices during the eighteen-month post Compact 
implementation period when the Compact held the raw price 
of milk constant at $1.46 per gallon. 
  I am aware of only one study (by Cotterill and 
Haller) in the industrial organization literature t hat 
directly examines the hypothesis that the mere threat of 
competition keeps market pricing competitive, 
notwithstanding barriers to entry.  This study rejects the 
hypothesis that the threat of entry keeps market pricing 
competitive.  Instead, the study concludes that entry is 
distinctly less likely in more concentrated markets, i.e., 
entry barriers exist in such markets, and pricing is less 
competitive. 
 
7b. Entry Barriers in Southern New York and New 
Jersey Local Market Areas and Royal Ahold Conduct 
that Enhances Entry Barriers 
  Turning now to the New York/New Jersey region, 
one of the most densely populated regions of the 
country, it is well known to industry participants that it 
is extremely difficult to “enter” this region.  Entry is 
defined as the addition of new stores by an operator that 
is new to the market area.  As such, it is often termed de 
novo entry.  Acquisition of existing stores only 
constitutes “entry” if it is a toe-hold acquisition by a new 
operator that leads to opening additional stores at new 
locations. 
  De novo entry in the Westchester, Poughkeepsie, 
Newburgh, and Trenton markets is not timely.  The 
political and administrative procedures required to 
procure a site and develop a store routinely take years.  
The lack of open land sites in locations with desirable 
trade flows makes it necessary to assemble parcels, often 
for shopping plazas, rather then obtain land for free 
standing stores.  This too can require years of effort.  
Locating and converting existing buildings or sites for 
supermarkets is also a time consuming and difficult 
process. 
  De novo entry into these markets is not likely even 
when a chain exercises market power.  A very profitable 
price increase in this high turnover industry can be as 
low as 1 or 2 percent, rather t han the traditional 5 
percent articulated in the DOJ merger guidelines.  Price 
increases of 1 or 2 percent can double a company’s after-
tax return on equity.  Moreover, price increases of this 
magnitude often go undetected by consumers, who are 
unable to r ecall the prices for the 30-40,000 items 
typically stocked in a modern supermarket.  Competitors 
and potential competitors, however, can measure such 
price changes but they find themselves facing the 
following chain store paradox (Scherer and Ross p.387; 
Fisher; Cotterill and Haller):  They know incumbent 
firms have raised prices, but incumbents, and especially 
large multi-market chains such as Royal Ahold, can 
undertake strategic actions to forestall entry by a 
potential lower priced competitor. The incumbents, for An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
 
 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 63  11
instance, can strategically lower prices to levels that ruin 
an actual entrant.  The mere threat of this conduct may 
discourage potential entrants.   
  Shop Rite's failed  de novo entry into Washington 
D.C. is the classic example of such entry forestalling 
conduct by incumbents (FTC 1969 and 1971).  Marion et 
al. (1979) write: 
 
Entry barriers can also be magnified if firms already 
in the market engage in selective price cutting aimed 
at the stores of the new entrant.  This occurred in 
Washington, D. C., in 1967, when Shop Rite 
(Foodarama), an aggressive discounter 
headquartered in New Jersey, attempted to enter the 
market.  The stores of two leading chains located 
near the stores of the new entrant cut their prices 
substantially below those charged i n the rest of the 
metropolitan area.  In doing so, those stores for 
which data was available sustained substantial 
losses.  This strategy of discouraging entry 
succeeded, and Shop Rite ultimately withdrew from 
the market.  Such selective price cutting seriously 
raises entry barriers to would-be entrants, thereby 
protecting established firms from potential 
competition. (Marion et al. 1979, p. 143) 
   
  One of the chains that defeated Shop Rite was Giant 
Foods, which subsequently was acquired by Royal 
Ahold. 
  Royal Ahold also has attempted to eliminate 
competition via lawsuit.  In the fall of 1999, I served as 
expert economist on behalf of a shopping mall owner in 
Milltown, New Jersey, who was sued by Royal Ahold 
for an alleged breach of contract (Mayfair Supermarkets 
Inc. v. Arisa Realty Co, LLC et al. No. MID-C-92-00).  
In that case, Royal Ahold entered into a contract (prior to 
its planned merger with Pathmark) with Arisa Realty to 
acquire a site for a supermarket in a shopping center.  
Ahold planned to close  its nearby Edwards store and 
move a short distance to the new site.  Subsequently, in 
anticipation of acquiring Pathmark and possibly to 
facilitate regulatory approval, Royal Ahold refused to 
honor its contract.  Arisa Realty then leased the site to 
Acme Supermarkets and construction began on an Acme 
store.  After the termination of the Pathmark transaction, 
Royal Ahold returned to Arisa Realty claiming that 
Ahold had never cancelled the contract and it sued to 
stop the Acme from opening a store on the site and to 
recover damages.  Counsel for Arisa Realty obtained, via 
the Freedom of Information Act, Royal Ahold’s Hart 
Scott Rodino filing (HSR) as it related to plans with 
respect to the Edwards store in question. 
  Paragraph 21 of the HSR requests information “for 
any new supermarket that the company … plans (or had 
plans) to open in each relevant area within the next 3 
years.”  The key language in this quote is “plans (or had 
plans).”  In its response (at 4) Royal Ahold lists Edwards 
store 220 but, significantly, there is no information 
concerning a proposed opening date.  Thus, it appears 
that Edwards store 220 falls into the “had plans” 
category.  If true, then Royal Ahold told the FTC, as it 
told Arisa Realty, that it had dropped plans to build a 
store on the Arisa site in order to obtain FTC approval.  
After the FTC blocked the transaction, however, Ahold 
sued Arisa Realty claiming that it never told Arisa that it 
no longer wanted the site.  In summary, Ahold instituted 
a lawsuit based upon premises that it knew were false, to 
forestall the entry of a competitor, Acme, into Milltown, 
New Jersey.  The lawsuit was settled at the start of trial 
on terms favorable to Arisa Realty and the Acme store is 
now open. 
  Another entry issue in this industry is Wal-Mart.  
(Since Kmart is currently bankrupt, I dismiss it as a 
potential or actual entrant into these markets.)  Industry 
observers commonly opine that supermarket operators 
face intense competitive threats and actual competition 
from Wal-Mart in many local markets.  It cannot be 
denied that Wal-Mart is an everyday low price operator 
and that it has had an impact upon firms that compete 
against it. Nonetheless, Wal-Mart’s impact on 
competition is not pervasive.  Franklin examined Wal-
Mart’s penetration into the food retailing industry.  He 
found that supermarket sales are an integral part of the 
Wal-Mart Supercenter format, but account for only 
approximately 50,000 square feet in a 150,000 square 
foot store.  These very large stores demand very large 
sites and draw their customers from the lower half of the 
income distribution (Franklin, p. 112).  Many 
communities in New York, New Jersey and New 
England simply do not want a Wal-Mart Supercenter in 
their town or city.  Consequently, Franklin reports that 
Wal-Mart’s p enetration into local geographic market 
areas is highest in other regions of the country. 
  Moreover, Franklin concludes that entry by these 
mass merchandisers in most food markets will never be 
sufficient to discipline market leaders because one 
cannot have an 180,000 square foot mass merchandiser 
with a superstore supermarket in every supermarket 
trade area of a city.  Moreover, the fact that Wal-Mart 
targets less affluent consumers also means relatively few 
outlets will saturate local food markets. While Wal-Mart 
is testing “Neighborhood” supermarkets to fill in the 
“spaces” between their Supercenters in local markets 
areas, their appearance and impact upon competition in 
the area of the country affected by this proposed 
acquisition is so unlikely and speculative that it must be An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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completely dismissed.
14 
  Perhaps the most telling evidence that de novo entry 
is not likely to occur is Ahold's own entry conduct.  
Ahold entered Washington D.C. by acquiring Giant.  
Ahold entered Long Island by acquiring First National 
(Edwards), and substantially increased their market share 
on Long Island by acquiring Stop & Shop (which had 
previously entered the Long Island area by acquiring a 
leading local chain, Mel Weitz).  Ahold entered the 
Trenton market by acquiring two Mayfair stores when 
they acquired the entire Mayfair chain.  Since this “toe 
hold” acquisition, they have not effectively generated 
any competitive pressure by opening new stores in the 
market.  Now they seek to acquire a dominant market 
position by merger.   
  Likewise, Ahold/Stop & Shop has assembled its 
current market share in the Newburgh and Poughkeepsie 
markets primarily by acquisition of existing chain 
supermarkets.  According to the Metro Market Studies’ 
Grocery Distribution Analysis and Guide for 2000 and 
2001, at least three and possibly all four Stop & Shop 
stores in the Newburgh market are former Grand Union 
Stores.  In Poughkeepsie, at least two of Stop & Shop’s 
five stores were acquired from other operators and it 
acquired another store only to close it because it 
competed with a nearby Stop & Shop.  (These three 
stores are the former Big V stores acquired by Starwood 
Ceruzzi).  Ahold’s conduct of expanding through 
acquisition of existing stores strongly suggests that de 
novo entry is not easy.  (See Appendix A for more 
information on how Starwood Ceruzzi and Stop & Shop 
are consolidating Stop & Shop’s power in the Newburgh 
market.)   
  A senior Ahold executive confirmed Ahold’s 
strategy of avoiding  de novo entry by explaining that 
securing Pathmark’s existing “beautiful store locations” 
was a major reason for the attempted Pathmark 
acquisition: 
 
“We found out with the Edwards chain … that it 
takes quite some time before you can get the 
locations, because it is a very reticulated trade area 
where Pathmark and Edwards operate,” says Hans 
Gobes, a senior vice president at Ahold’s 
headquarters in The Netherlands.  “That’s why we 
like so much of the idea of becoming the owner of 
Pathmark. It has all of these beautiful locations.” 
[Tosh, p33] 
 
Similarly, Big V, in a Private Placement 
                                                             
14 Wal-Mart’s Neighborhood Markets are in “test mode.” The 
company plans to open 185 new Supercenters but only 15-20 
Neighborhood Markets in 2002 (Zwiebach, p1). 
Memorandum prepared in 2000 in connection with a 
possible sale of the company, touts its strong position in 
the lower Hudson River Valley: 
 
Big V “has amassed a portfolio of prime store 
locations in the increasingly popular residential 
communities of its core market … Stores are most 
often located in high traffic centers of each town and 
in many cases, [Big V] is the sole operator in towns 
which management believes require only one store” 
(Big V, Private Placement Memorandum p. 2-3). 
 
  Ahold/Stop & Shop’s latest attempt to erect barriers 
to entry in the northeast United States involves its 
acquisition of shopping centers and other sites suitable 
for supermarkets not for the purpose of operating a 
supermarket, but so that a competing supermarket cannot 
operate on the site.  For example, as noted above, 
Starwood Ceruzzi acquired a Big V store in 
Poughkeepsie, New York across the street from a Stop & 
Shop, and rather than lease the store to a Stop & Shop 
competitor, the site has remained without a tenant for 
over one year.  In fact, I understand from Wakefern that 
Stop & Shop has acquired no fewer than ten shopping 
centers in the northeast, and that only one of these 
centers has a supermarket tenant.  Moreover, Starwood 
Ceruzzi, which in the past has developed supermarkets 
for Stop & Shop and acquired supermarkets and then 
sold these stores to Stop & Shop, has purchased fourteen 
shopping centers.  Not one of these fourteen centers has 
a supermarket tenant.  This anti-competitive “land-
banking” strategy is consistent with the conduct of 
Ahold/Stop & Shop described above—to erect and 
maintain barriers to entry and thereby acquire and 
maintain a dominant position in the regions where 
ShopRite competes.  The impact of this conduct on 
reducing  competition cannot be understated: as 
recognized by Thomas Infusino, Wakefern’s Chairman, 
when he testified at trial as to entry barriers ( Big V 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Wakefern Food Corp.): 
 
There are not many locations that are readily 
available today because the area is saturated with 
competitors, and it costs $5 million and requires 
three-five years (due in part to the need to obtain 
necessary regulatory approvals) to open a new store 
(Infusino, 2001, p. 100:15-17, 101:1-13). 
 
  In fact, the Big V Private Placement Memorandum 
confirms that “potential competitors attempting to enter 
these markets find it difficult to secure attractive sites 
due to the lengthy permit and approval process involving 
complex and at times uncooperative environmental and An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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zoning organizations” (Big V, Private Placement 
Memorandum p. 3). 
 
8.  Competitive Effects: The Price Impact of Stop & 
Shop’s Proposed Acquisition of Big V 
 
  Based on the documented, positive statistical 
relationship between the HHI and the prices charged by 
Ahold s upermarkets (Stop & Shop and Super G), it is 
possible to predict the impact on prices of the proposed 
Shop & Stop acquisition and the completed acquisition 
of two former Big V stores from Starwood Ceruzzi in 
the three identified geographic market areas, 
Poughkeepsie, Newburgh, and Trenton.  The percent 
change in Royal Ahold retail prices following those 
transactions can be estimated based on the following 
equation:
15 Percent Change in Retail Prices = 0.0632 x 
Percent Change in HHI. 
  Using this equation, and as set forth in Table 7, the 
proposed Stop & Shop acquisition increases HHI 39.3 
percent and Stop & Shop retail prices 2.5 percent in 
Poughkeepsie.  If the acquisition is blocked and the two 
stores acquired from Starwood Ceruzzi are divested to 
Big V, the  HHI drops 18.9 percent and Stop & Shop 
retail prices drop 1.2 percent. 
  In the Newburgh market, the proposed acquisition 
increases the HHI 48.6 percent and raises Stop & Shop 
retail prices 3.1.  In the Trenton market, the acquisition 
of the Big V stores increases the HHI 32.2 percent and 
the prices in these stores will be 2.0 percent higher than 
prices prior to the merger. 
 
9.  Competitive Effects: Raising Rivals’ Costs, the 
Potential Predatory Effect on Wakefern Food 
Corporation and Shop Rite Supermarket Retailers 
 
  This Section discusses another effect of a Stop 
& Shop acquisition of Big V:  The acquisition, if 
permitted, will raise Wakefern and its members’ 
costs, thereby potentially undercutting Wakefern’s 
ability to provide low prices to the consumer.  Salop 
and Scheffman have developed a theoretical 
analysis of how dominant firms in a market can 
raise a rival’s costs so as to constrain the rival’s 
ability to compete, thereby permitting the dominant 
firm to raise price and increase profits.  In most 
cases, this cost-focused move against a rival is more 
profitable than lowering prices because the larger 
firm has a relative cost advantage.  In the extreme 
                                                             
15 This equation comes from the statistical analysis reported in 
Cotterill, 1999b (p. 34, equation 2). 
case, the dominant firm actually elevates a 
competitor’s costs enough to force one or more 
competitors out of business.   
  The Big V situation represents a multimarket 
extension of the Salop and Scheffman model.  Big V is 
the largest member of the Wakefern cooperative system.  
Recently it accounted for 13 percent of Wakefern’s 
volume ( Big V Supermarkets, Inc. v. Wakefern Food 
Corp., 267 B.R. 71, at 7).  I have made no quantitative 
assessment of the impact on Wakefern of losing 13 
percent of its volume.  Wakefern, however, has, and 
those analyses—which demonstrate that  after cost-
cutting by Wakefern, each member of Wakefern will 
have to bear approximately $230,000 in increased costs 
per store if Big V is acquired—have been provided to 
the FTC by Wakefern (Wakefern 2000, 1997).  Based on 
the economics of the industry, Wakefern’s analysis is 
hardly surprising.  This loss in volume must significantly 
elevate Wakefern’s costs to supply other members of the 
Shop Rite cooperative.  A quick calculation indicates 
that reducing volume 13 percent elevates other 
members’ payments to cover fixed costs by (100-(100/1-
0.13)), or 14.9 percent.  Moreover, the loss of Big V 
volume would likely increase fixed costs to an even 
greater degree due to increased financial costs.  In its 
decision in Big V Supermarkets, Inc. v. Wakefern Food 
Corp., the Court wrote: 
 
Wakefern’s loan agreements all have financial 
covenants requiring minimum tangible net worth, 
debt service capability, and fixed charge coverage 
ratio.  If Big V were to leave, Wakefern would be 
perilously close to violating its loan covenants.  If 
that were to happen, the lenders could accelerate 
$285 million of debt, which Wakefern could not 
pay.  That would force Wakefern into reorganization 
or liquidation (Big V Supermarkets, Inc. v. Wakefern 
Food Corp. p. 30). 
 
Finally, Wakefern and its members’ costs would 
increase due to a decrease in Wakefern’s volume related 
discounts. 
  Kenneth Jasinkiewicz, Wakefern’s Chief Financial 
Officer, testified at trial concerning the impact on the 
remaining Wakefern members (i.e., store operators) of 
Big V being acquired by Stop & Shop (using an estimate 
of increased costs of $212,000 per store):  
 
You’d have several impacts.  First of all, dealing 
with the newer members who haven’t had a chance 
to really build any type of equity in their business.  
Some of those members today are not making 
$212,000 per year.  So, that would put them into a An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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loss position.  And if those members were to 
continue losing money, they could eventually be out 
of business.  And you could have a domino effect 
because similar type of thing, if they go out of 
business, then those [costs] get passed on to the 
remaining membership. 
  As far as the members who have been around 
for a longer time, let me just give you by way of 
illustration.  Let’s take an average store that does 
$600,000 a week, that’s $31 million a year.  This is 
an industry that has very low margins.  You know, 
one percent after tax has been used over the years.  
$212,000 on 31 million is seven tenths pretax.  
Seven tenths is a lot of percentage of the profit.  
Take a chain that has 20 stores, $212,000 is $4.2 
million a year. That may be enough to blow some of 
their [debt] covenants.  It’s going to restrict them as 
far as their capital expenditures going forward and 
growing their business.  So, the short answer to your 
question, it could have a serious impact on the coop 
(Jasinkiewicz, 2001, p. 138:9-139:5). 
 
10. Summary and Conclusions 
   
  Table 8 summarizes my trade and market area 
analysis, and identifies stores that Stop & Shop should 
not be permitted to acquire.  (Table 8 also identifies all 
but one of the Big V stores that are currently operating 
and the 27 that Stop & Shop seeks to acquire.)
16  
  Based upon my trade area analysis, Stop & Shop 
should be prohibited from buying 11 of the 27 stores in 
question.  These 11 stores account for $332 million, or 
38.1 percent, of the proposed Stop & Shop acquisition.  
If I include the four questionable stores from the trade 
area analysis (identified in Table 2), Stop & Shop should 
be blocked from acquiring $458 million in Big V annual 
sales, or 52.5 percent of the proposed acquisition.   
  Based on my market area analysis, Stop & Shop 
should be prohibited from acquiring an even greater 
number of stores—17 stores with $523 million in annual 
sales, or 59.8 percent of the proposed acquisition.  This 
divestiture is so large that the proposed transaction 
should simply be blocked.  Moreover, the transaction 
should be blocked because it will significantly raise 
costs to the remaining Wakefern members, thereby 
damaging their ability to compete on price and 
inevitably resulting in i ncreased prices to consumers 
throughout the region. 
  Divestiture in this case would be perverse.  
Wakefern would have to obtain approval of the antitrust 
agencies to buy back its member’s stores.  From an 
                                                             
16 Table 8 does not include the Big V Shop Rite in Florida, 
N.Y. 
antitrust and cooperative economics perspective, the 
burden is on the wrong party.  Competitors should not be 
allowed to use the antitrust process to severely weaken 
or destroy a cooperative. Cooperatives generally act as 
competitive yardsticks in markets, lowering costs and 
prices and benefiting consumers (Cotterill, 1987, 1997; 
Rogers and Petraglia; Haller).  In this case, the actions of 
Stop & Shop will severely weaken or destroy the pro-
competitive impact of the nation’s largest wholesale 
grocery cooperative. The costs of its wholesaling 
services to Big V are lower than those of the alternative 
supplier to Big V and Stop & Shop, C&S. Due to this 
fact and other reasons, the independent Shop Rite 
supermarket operators are tough competitors in the 
Northeast. 
  Based on the facts available to me at this time and 
my analysis, I conclude that the FTC and/or state 
antitrust authorities in New York and New Jersey should 
block the proposed transaction.  They also should undo 
the Starwood Ceruzzi transaction to restore Big V as a 
competitor in the Poughkeepsie market.  Force 
Ahold/Stop & Shop to compete with Big V on the 
merits.  Let the bankruptcy court undo the damage of 
financial leverage at Big V and restore it to viable 
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Table 1. Trade Area Analysis: Identification of Thirteen Shop Rite Stores that Should NOT be Sold to Stop & Shop.
1 
 
          Other  Other  Other 
Shop Rite    Shop Rite  Stop & Shop  Combined  Competitor 1  Competitor 2  Competitor 3  No. of other 




#223  859 South Dr., Wappingers Falls  14.38  40.24  54.62  Price Chopper  Hannaford  Ferra’s  3 
          27.40  13.70  4.28 
#256  Highway 9, Fishkill  29.91  29.21  59.12  Wal-Mart  A&P
3  Beacon  3 
          25.70  9.35  5.84 
Newburgh Market 
#232  Highway 17, Monroe  54.45  13.46  67.91  Wal-Mart      1 
          32.09 
#265  121 Dolson Ave., Middletown  44.12  11.56  55.68  Price Chopper  Hannaford  Redners  3 
          16.38  16.38  11.56 
#210  400 Rt. 211E, Middletown  44.12  11.56  55.68  Price Chopper  Hannaford  Redners  3 
          16.38  16.38  11.56 
#243  88 North Plank Rd. Newburgh  37.19  18.43  55.62  Price Chopper  Weis  Beacon  4 
          30.99  5.03  4.19 
#248  Rt. 32, Vails Gate  39.15  19.40  58.55  Price Chopper  Weis  Gu Market  3 
          32.63  5.29  3.53 
Westchester County 
#206  S. Riverside Ave., Croton on Hudson  31.67  26.67  58.34  A&P/Food Emporium    1 
          41.67 
#211  747 Bedford Rd., Bedford Hills  26.44  8.05  34.49  A&P/Food Emporium    1 
          65.52 
#274  960 Broadway, Thornwood  18.97  32.23  51.20  A&P  Key Food  Chappaqua  3 
          34.07  11.05  3.68 
Trenton Market 
#534  1720 Nottingham, Trenton  34.80  17.98
2  52.78  Acme  Super Fresh(A&P)  Risoldis  5 
          32.48  8.12  2.90 
#536  1235 Rt. 32, Trenton  42.42  15.66
2  58.08  Acme  Super Fresh(A&P)  Marrazzos  5 
          24.38  6.64  5.95 
#540  622 Highway 206, Trenton  48.14  8.21
2  56.35  Acme  Super Fresh(A&P)  Marrazzos  4 
        26.55  7.54  6.75 
 
1 Stop & Shop has agreed not to purchase stores #223 and #243.  Based on a five-mile area radius, i.e. sales of all supermarkets within 5 miles of the Shop Rite 
are included when computing market shares. 
2 Super G stores share. 
3 Future A&P store. 




Table 2. Trade Area Analysis: Identification of Shop Rite Stores that are Questionable Sales to Stop & Shop. 
 
          Other  Other  Other 
Shop Rite    Shop Rite  Stop & Shop  Combined  Competitor 1  Competitor 2  Competitor 3  No. of other 





1  240 Sanford Blvd E., Mount Vernon  18.67  17.37  36.04  C Town  Pathmark  A&P  7 
          17.08  13.75  10.13 
 
#271
2  278 Tuckahoe, Yonkers  17.73  13.71  31.44  Stew Leonards  A&P  Pathmark  9 
          21.90  21.61  15.43 
 
#283
2  25-43 Prospect, Yonkers  22.58  11.29  33.87  Stew Leonards  Food Emp.(A&P)  Food Town  8 
          28.69   24.27  3.57 
 
Trenton Market 
#542  2555 Pennington, Pennington  22.44  16.44
3  38.88  Pennignton  Acme  Marrazzos  4 
        29.01  14.51  11.03 
 
1 Trade Area is a two-mile radius. 
2 Trade Area is a three-mile radius. 
3 Super G stores share. 
Source: Computed from Big V Five-mile Interaction Report, Appendix D 
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Table 3. Number of Supermarkets, Supermarket Shares and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for Metro Market  
Studies Grocery Distribution Analysis and Guide Defined Market Areas: 1994, 1997, and 2000. 
 
    1994      1997      2000 
  #  Share  HHI  #  Share  HHI  #  Share  HHI 
 
Poughkeepsie (Dutchess County) 
Stop & Shop  2  12.9  166  3  21.3  454  5  39.4  1552 
Big V  5  33.4  1116  5  32.6  1063  2  16.1  259 
A&P  4  11.4  130  3  8.8  77  3  14.2  201 
Grand Union  11  28.6  818  12  30.2  912  6  11.5  132 
Price Chopper  2  6.4  41  2  7.2  52  2  10.9  118 
Wal-Mart              1  7.9  62 
Edwards
2  1  5.0  25 
Great American  1  2.2  5             
  26  99.9  2301  25  100.1  2558  19  100.0  2326 
 
Newburgh (Orange County N.Y., Pike County, PA) 
Big V  8  51.6  2663  9  55.8  3114  9  46.1  2125 
Stop & Shop              4  18.2  331 
Price Chopper  2  8.7  76  3  12.3  151  3  10.8  116 
Grand Union  8  25.8  666  9  23.9  571  4  6.0  36 
Wal-Mart              1  5.6  31 
Hannaford              1  4.9  24 
Lloyd’s  1  4.1  17  1  3.9  15  1  3.3  10 
Redner’s              1  2.6  6 
Weis  1  2.9  8  1  2.8  8  1  2.6  6 
Great American  1  2.0  4  1  1.3  2   
A&P  1  2.7  7 
Food Town  1  2.2  5             
  23  100.0  3446  24  100.0  3861  25  100.0  2688 
 
Trenton (Mercer County) 
Big V              4  25.2  635 
Acme  5  20.8  432  5  27.5  756  5  21.1  445 
Giant        2  12.7  161  2  12.6  158 
Wegman’s              1  9.1  132 
A&P  4  14.8  219  2  9.0  81  3  10.9  118 
Shop Rite  1  8.6  74  1  11.1  123  1  8.3  68 
Shop Rite (Wakefern)              1  6.0  36 
Pathmark  2  10.6  112  1  6.8  46  1  4.4  19 
Shop N Bag  2  12.1  146  2  14.9  222   
Foodtown  2  7.5  56  3  12.3  151   
Mayfair/Foodtown
1  2  9.5  90             
Thriftway  7  13.0  169  3  5.6  31   
Price Slasher  1  3.1  10             
  26  100.0  1308  19  99.9  1571  18  100.0  1614 
 
1 Royal Ahold acquired these Mayfair stores, converting them to Giant before 1997. 
2 Became a Stop & Shop in 1996. 
Source: Calculated from Metro Market Studies, Grocery Distribution Analysis and Guide, 35
th, 38
th, 41
st editions, 2001, 1998, 1995, 
Weston, MA, Tucson, AZ. An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
 
 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 63  20
 
Table 4. Poughkeepsie N.Y. Market (Dutchess County): Current 2002 Estimates of Market Share and HHI 









Sales  HHI 
Super Stop & Shop      514       Rte 9 & Saint Andrews Rd       Hyde Park           43,500 $575,000 7.3  38.8 1504
Super Stop & Shop      517       727 Beekman Rd                   Hopewell Junction   31,000 $375,000 4.8    
Super Stop & Shop      538       6734 Hwy 9                       Rhinebeck           27,000 $225,000 2.9    
Super Stop & Shop      540       Plaza 44 Hwy 44                  Poughkeepsie        41,000 $700,000 8.9    
Super Stop & Shop      597       483 South Rd                     Poughkeepsie        49,000 $550,000 7.0    
Super Stop & Shop      598       1357 Hwy 9                       Wappingers Falls    46,000 $625,000 7.9    
ShopRite 223                     859 South Rd & Hwy 9            Wappingers Falls    38,000 $420,000 5.3  13.5 182
ShopRite 256                     Hwy 9 & Commonwealth Dr         Fishkill            39,100 $640,000 8.1    
Price Chopper Supermarket        838 South Rd                     Poughkeepsie        52,000 $375,000 4.8  10.2 103
Price Chopper Supermarket    12  432 South Rd                     Poughkeepsie        55,000 $425,000 5.4    
A & P Future Store      169      1227 St Hwy 52                   Fishkill            27,000 $200,000 2.5  9.2 85
A & P Sav A Center       94      Hwy 44 & North Ave              Pleasant Valley     27,000 $250,000 3.2    
A & P Store        3             1115 Rt 82 & Taconic Pky       Lagrangeville       29,000 $275,000 3.5    
Gu Market     1816               Main St & Hwy 44                 Pleasant Valley     15,000 $100,000 1.3  7.3 53
Gu Market     1874               Hwy 9 S & Albany Post Rd        Hyde Park           18,000 $100,000 1.3    
Gu Market     1878               Hwy 22 & Mill St                 Dover Plains        10,900 $125,000 1.6    
Gu Market     1895               St Hwy 22 & Cascade Mtn Rd      Amenia              14,400 $100,000 1.3    
Gu Market     1929               35 Hwy 44 E                      Millerton           20,000 $150,000 1.9    
Wal Mart Supercenter     1810    2400 Us Hwy 9                    Fishkill            55,000 $550,000 7.0  7.0 49
Hannaford  Rt 9 & 93  Wappinger Falls  50,000 $400,000 5.1  5.1 26
Tiberios Redhook IGA Store       7568 N Broadway                  Red Hook            28,000 $225,000 2.9  2.9 8
Pawling Ag Market IGA            63 E Main St                     Pawling             8,000 $80,000 1.0  1.0 1
Adams Fair Acre Farm Market      765 Dutchess Tpke                Poughkeepsie        35,000 $175,000 2.2  2.2 5
Beacon Market                    451 Fishkill Ave                 Beacon              17,000 $125,000 1.6  1.6 3
Frankies Superette               Hwy 82                           Hopewell Junction   11,000 $100,000 1.3  1.3 2
            $7,865,000 100.0  100.0 2020
Source: Wakefern Food Corporation 
 
Conclusion 1: From this situation, as of February 2002, if Stop & Shop acquires Fishkill Big V Shop Rite and captures all of 
Wappinger Falls Shop Rite when it closes: 
•  Stop & Shop’s market share increases from 38.8 percent to 52.3 percent. 
•  The HHI increases from 2020 to 3068. 
•  The increase in the HHI is 1048 points. 
 
Conclusion 2: If the sales of Big V Shop Rite #223, which will close, are prorated to the other two supermarkets in Wappinger Falls 
and the nearby Poughkeepsie Price Chopper, in proportion to their sales, then: 
•  Stop & Shop market share increases 10.5 points to 49.3 percent and Hannaford’s share increases 1.5 points to 6.6 percent and 
Price Chopper’s combined share increases 1.4 to 11.6. 
•  The HHI increases from 2020 to 2814. 
•  The increase in the HHI is 794 points. 
 
Conclusion 3:  Stop & Shop bought, in February 2001 from Starwood/Ceruzzi, a developer, 2 Shop Rite stores that the developer 
purchased from Big V in violation of Big V’s Wakefern stockholder’s agreement.  If the FTC were to order Stop & Shop to divest 
these stores (Stop & Shop #514, Stop & Shop #517), and assuming closed store #223 sales are prorated to the Stop & Shop, 
Hannaford, and Price Chopper stores, the market impact would be: 
•  Stop & Shop’s market share would drop to 29.1%. 
•  The HHI decreases from 2020 to 1638, below the merger guidelines 1800 point cutoff . 
•  The decrease is 382 points. An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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Table 5. Newburgh N.Y. Market (Orange County): Current 2002 Estimates of Market Share and HHI 









of Sales  HHI 
ShopRite 210                     400 Rty 211 E                    Middletown          35,400 $550,000 5.7  50.7  2573
ShopRite 232                     Hwy 17m                          Monroe              46,600 $675,000 7.0    
ShopRite 234                     1 Hawkins Dr                     Montgomery          42,000 $525,000 5.4    
ShopRite 240                     78 Brookside Ave                 Chester             52,000 $640,000 6.6    
ShopRite 243                     88 N Plank Rd Ste 1              Newburgh            28,400 $410,000 4.3    
ShopRite 248                     Rt 32                            Vails Gate          52,000 $700,000 7.3    
ShopRite 252                     153 Hwy 94 S & Moe Rd           Warwick             41,600 $680,000 7.1    
ShopRite 265                     125 Dolson Ave                   Middletown          33,600 $585,000 6.1    
ShopRite 277                     176 N Main St                    Florida             25,700 $125,000 1.3    
Super Stop & Shop      523       Hwy 17 & Still Rd                Monroe              33,400 $325,000 3.4  14.8  219
Super Stop & Shop      524       60 Brotherhood Plaza Dr         Washingtonville    26,600 $250,000 2.6    
Super Stop & Shop      525       330 Hwy 211 E                    Middletown          48,000 $300,000 3.1    
Super Stop & Shop      528       1429 Hwy 300                     Newburgh            40,000 $550,000 5.7    
Price Chopper Supermarket    10  39 N Plank Rd                    Newburgh            49,000 $450,000 4.7  14.0  196
Price Chopper Supermarket    11  511 Schutte Rd Ext               Middletown          46,500 $425,000 4.4    
Price Chopper Supermarket    14  115 Temple Hill Rd Ste D       New Windsor        51,000 $475,000 4.9    
Wal Mart Supercenter     2637    288 Industrial Park Rd           Monroe              42,600 $775,000 8.0  8.0  65
Hannaford Food & Drug      337   30 Tower Dr                      Middletown          45,400 $425,000 4.4  4.4  19
Redners Warehouse Market      1  156 Dolson Ave                   Middletown          38,400 $300,000 3.1  3.1  10
GU Market     3269               Quaker Ave                       Cornwall            10,700 $100,000 1.0  2.1  4
GU Market     3277               299 Main St & Benhaven Rd       Highland Falls      10,900 $100,000 1.0    
Weis Market      411             1067 Union Ave                   Newburgh            25,000 $150,000 1.6  1.6  2
Valley Supreme Super Market      St Hwy 52                        Pine Bush           14,000 $125,000 1.3  1.3  2
            $9,640,000 100.0  100.0  3090




If Stop & Shop is allowed to acquire Big V Shop Rite: 
•  Stop & Shops market share increases from 14.8% to 65.5%. 
•  The HHI increases from 3090 to 4591. 
•  The increase is 1501 points. 
 An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
 
 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 63  22
 
Table 6. Trenton N.J. Market Area
1: Current 2002 Estimates of Market Share and HHI 









of Sales  HHI 
ShopRite 534 (Big V)                    1720 Nottingham Way            Trenton             34,000 $325,000 4.2 35.4  1250 
ShopRite 536 (Big V)                    1235 Rte 33                      Hamilton Square     36,000 $675,000 8.7   
ShopRite 540 (Big V)                    622 Hwy 206 & Martin Ave  Bordentown  42,000 $660,000 8.5   
ShopRite 542 (Big V)                    2555 Pennington Rd               Pennington          27,200 $580,000 7.5   
ShopRite 544 (Big V)                    1750 White Horse Rd              Hamilton            32,000 $500,000 6.5   
Acme Market     7919             953 Rte 33                       Hamilton Square     41,000 $530,000 6.8 26.2  686 
Acme Market     7947             1 Sunnybrae Blvd                 Yardville           39,400 $600,000 7.7   
Acme Market     7957             1061 White Horse Ave            Hamilton            33,000 $200,000 2.6   
Acme Market     7979             Rte 1 & Texas Ave                Lawrenceville       41,000 $375,000 4.8   
Acme Market     7983             Farnsworth Ave & Hwy 130  Bordentown  31,000 $325,000 4.2   
Super G Food & Drug      267     1556 N Olden Ave Ext            Trenton             48,000 $425,000 5.5 10.2  104 
Super G Food & Drug      268     635 S Clinton St                 Trenton             35,200 $365,000 4.7   
Pennington Quality Market        Delaware & Hwy 31               Pennington          33,000 $750,000 9.7 9.7  94 
Marrazzos Thriftway              1091 Washington Blvd            Trenton             36,000 $300,000 3.9 7.5  57 
Marrazzos Thriftway  1400 Pkwy Ave                    Trenton             23,600 $285,000 3.7   
Super Fresh (A&P)      42  2465 S Broad St                  Hamilton            40,600 $335,000 4.3 6.5  42 
Super Fresh (A&P)      48  1300 Parkway Ave                 Trenton             20,600 $170,000 2.2   
Pabers Shop N Bag                1080 White Horse Ave            Trenton             15,000 $125,000 1.6 1.6  3 
Risoldis Thriftway               3100 Quakerbridge Rd            Mercerville         17,000 $125,000 1.6 1.6  3 
Fine Fare Supermarket  1605 Calhoun St                  Trenton             23,000 $100,000 1.3 1.3  2 
            $7,750,000 100.0 100.0  2240 
Source: Wakefern Food Corporation 
 
1 The Market area is western Mercer County and Bordentown. (Eastern Mercer County stores in Princeton, Princeton Junction, and 





If Super G Food and Drug is allowed to acquire Big V Shop Rite: 
•  Super G Market share increases from 10.2% to 45.6%. 
•  The HHI increases from 2240 to 2962. 
•  The increase in the HHI is 722 points. 
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Table 7. Predicted Retail Price Impacts of the Proposed Royal Ahold/Stop & Shop Acquisition  
in Three Market Areas and the Return of Two Supermarkets in Poughkeepsie, New York. 
 
    Initial  Change in  % Change  % Change in 
  Action  HHI  HHI  in HHI  Retail Price 
 
Poughkeepsie, NY 
Stop & Shop Acquires Big V  2020  794  39.3  2.5 
 
Poughkeepsie, NY 
Stop & Shop returns two stores 
To Big V    2020  -382  -18.9  -1.2 
 
Newburgh, NY    3090  1501  48.6  3.1 
 
Trenton, NJ    2240  722  32.2  2.0 
 
 
Source: Cotterill 1999b, p. 34 equation 2; and Tables 4, 5, 6. An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop’s Proposed Acquisition  Cotterill 
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Table 8. Summary Table of the Trade and Market Area Analysis Identifying Stores that Stop & Shop Should Not be Allowed to Buy 
 
      Stores Stop & Shop Should Not Buy 
      27 Stores    Market Area and 
    Big V Stores  Stop & Shop  Trade Area  Trade Area  Questionable  
Store   Address  Annual Sales
1  Wants to Buy  Dominance  Dominance  Stores 
 
Columbia County 
#258  Hudson  20,800 
 
Dutchess County 
#223  Wappingers Falls  21,840     
#256  Fishkill  33,280  33,280  33,280  33,280 
 
Orange County 
#210  Middletown  29,120  29,120  29,120  29,120 
#232  Monroe  35,100  35,100  35,100  35,100 
#234  Mongomery  27,300  27,300    27,300 
#240  Chester  33,280  33,280    33,280 
#243  Newburgh  21,320     
#244  Montague  40,300  40,300    40,300 
#248  Vails Gate  36,400  36,400  36,400  36,400 
#252  Warwick  35,360  35,360    35,360 
#265  Middletown  30,420  30,420  30,420  30,420 
 
Putnam County 
#230  Carmel  33,540  33,540 
 
Sullivan County 
#214  Monticello  21,580  21,580 
#249  Liberty  19,500  19,500 
 
Ulster County 
#236  Kingston  33,800  33,800 
#250  Ellenville  16,900  16,900 
#286  New Paltz  22,880  22,880 
 
Westchester County 
#206  Croton on Hudson  24,700  24,700  24,700  24,700 
#209  Mount Vernon  33,540  33,540      33,540 
#211  Bedford Hills  29,900  29,900  29,900  29,900 
#271  Yonkers  39,000  39,000      39,000 
#274  Thornwood  26,780  26,780  26,780  26,780 
#283  Yonkers  23,400  23,400      23,400 
#289  Peekskill  40,300  40,300   
 
Trenton 
#534  Trenton  16,900  16,900  16,900  16,900 
#536  Hamilton Square  35,100  35,100  35,100  35,100 
#540  Bordentown  34,320  34,320  34,320  34,320 
#542  Pennington  30,160  30,160    30,160  30,160 
#544  Hamilton  24,960  24,960    24,960   
   total    871,780  807,820  332,020  523,380  126,100 
 
1 This column includes 30 Big V supermarkets.  Big V operates one other supermarket at its corporate head quarters in Florida N.Y. 
Apparently that supermarket is part of the complex and not marketable. 
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Market Level Milk Price  







































































Hartford Stop & Shop Milk  AO stores 
Source: Calculated from Food Marketing Policy Center IRI database. 
Figure 1. 
 






Stop & Shop vs All Other Supermarkets  
Market Level Milk Price  







































































Providence Stop & Shop  AO Supermarkets 
Source: Calculated from Food Marketing Policy Center IRI database. 
Figure 2. 
 




Boston Stop & Shop vs All Other Boston Supermarkets 
Milk Price Per Gallon 
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Appendix A 
 
Wakefern Strategic Assessment of Starwood Ceruzzi and 
Stop & Shop Moves to limit Entry by Competitors to Stop 
& Shop 
 
At present, Stop & Shop is seeking to increase its market 
share in the Hudson River Valley and Westchester County, 
both by acquisition of Big V Supermarkets, Inc. and by 
obtaining control of sites which might otherwise be used as 
competitive supermarkets.  In February, 2001, Starwood 
Ceruzzi, a developer which develops and sells or leases 
supermarkets acquired three (3) ShopRite supermarkets from 
Big V.  They were located in Hyde Park, New York; 
Beekman, New York; and Poughkeepsie, New York.  The 
Beekman and Hyde Park stores are now operated as Stop & 
Shops, but the Poughkeepsie site, which was a free-standing 
site located directly across the street from a new Stop & Shop, 
remains dark a year after its acquisition. 
More recently, Starwood Ceruzzi developed sites in 
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania and Wyomissing, Pennsylvania 
on behalf of Big V.  When Big V failed to open Wyomissing 
and rejected the Wilkes-Barre lease, the sites were converted 
to Stop & Shops.  Starwood Ceruzzi has also acquired a site 
on Dolson Avenue in Middletown, New York where Big V 
had intended to develop a 85,000 sq. ft. replacement store for 
a ShopRite that is located less than one-quarter of a mile 
away, also on Dolson Avenue.  Not only has Starwood 
Ceruzzi acquired the site that Big V intended to develop, but it 
has also made an offer to buy the center where the current 
Dolson Avenue ShopRite is l ocated.  When the Shop Rite 
lease expires in August 2003, Stop & Shop will in effect be 
our landlord.  It would be reasonable to believe that Stop & 
Shop would choose to operate one of the two Dolson Avenue 
sites and have Starwood Ceruzzi seek a nonsupermarket tenant 
for the other site.  Given the actions of Starwood Ceruzzi and 
Stop & Shop with respect to the Poughkeepsie ShopRite, it is 
very unlikely that Starwood Ceruzzi would seek to put a 
supermarket into the Dolson Avenue site not occupied by Stop 
& Shop.   
The same situation exists in the towns of New Paltz and 
Lloyd, New York.  Starwood Ceruzzi has acquired the center 
in New Paltz where Big V currently operates a ShopRite of 
32,000 sq. ft. The store is old and small and must be expanded 
or replaced in order to remain competitively viable.  Big V 
had entered into negotiations to develop a site in Lloyd, New 
York, 1-1/4 miles from the New Paltz store.  The developer 
has recently obtained the necessary approvals from the 
municipality to develop a supermarket on the site.  Starwood 
Ceruzzi is now attempting to buy the site from the current 
developer so that again, it would be in a situation where it 
would control both the site where a ShopRite is located and 
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